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Abstract
The question of the importance of plea bargaining for sentencing leniency
has received considerable attention recently. Thi5 research examines the
relationship between plea bargaining and sentencing in the armed forces.
Records of 440 cases in five U.S. Army, Europe, court-martial jurisdictions
for one twelve month period are analyzed. The study reports on decisions made.
at two levels of adjudication for three kinds of sentencing (discharge,
deprivation of liberty, and confinement length). Sentencing outcomes of plea
bargainers are compared to their original agreements, to other pleaders
(straight guilty and not guilty pleaders), and to other case characteristics.
The results indi~ate that plea bargaining favored the accused only with
confinement length decisions at less serious courts. The findings also
suggest that plea bargaining plays a minor role in explaining sentencing
decisions.
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Plea bargaining affects sentencing.

Or does it? Do sentencing

differentials accrue to plea negotiators? The deceptively simple and
conventional answer is yes: plea bargainers consistently receive less severe
punishment than other kinds of pleaders.

But recent research suggests that·

this question is complex and any answer requires qualifiers.

This paper

explores the impact of bargaining on sentencing in a unique setting:

the·

military.
Type of plea is one commonly examined variable in studies of sentencing
outcomes.

Some scholars have found a significant relationship between

pleading guilty and mitigation of punishment (Hagan tl..fil., 1979; Nagel
Hagan, 1982; Nardulli, 1978; Talarico, 1979; Zatz, 1984)~

&

Others have not.1

Several efforts have been made to look at the issue through the use of
multiple measures of sentence severity--specifically, the in/out (confinement
vs. nonconfinement) and length of confinement decisions.

Welch et al. (1985)

found that guilty pleaders received lighter sentences on both measures.
Wheel er ~ . (1982} report that guilty pleaders failed to receive leniency in
tenns of the in/out decision, but did succeed in tenns of the length of
incarceration decision.
__ ..,

On the other hand, Uhlman & Walker (1979, 1980),

_;

using three stylized sentencing measures, found overall leniency for guilty
pleaders only when compared to those few tried by jury.2 Finally,

Eisenstein

&Jacob (1977} found that pleading method made no difference for either the
in/out or confinement length decision.
These conflicting findings may be in part attributed to methodological
differentes among studies.

Sample selection, statistical technique, and

variations in defintions of plea bargaining distinguish studies.
guilty pleas with plea bargaining, for example, is hazardous.

Equating all

Some defendants

plead guilty for purposes of closure (to get it over with),3 or to limit the

2
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negative effects of the conviction label (Bernstein et al. 1977) rather than to
reduce severity of sentence.

Others plead guilty because they are less able

to bargain (Figueira-McDonough, 1985; Wynne & Hartnagel, 1975).

Bargaining

itself takes overt and covert fonns, leading to different sentencing outcomes.
Additionally, some of the inconsistent findings may be a result of
characteristics unique to the jurisdictions,4 time period, or offenses
studied.5
Despite these mixed results, the weight of available evidence still
favors the differential sentencing hypothesis that sentencing payoffs for plea
bargaining are not illusory.

Still, far too few studies have focused on

multiple measured sentence differentials in different settings for us to be
reasonably confident with its reality across jurisdictions.

This paper

addresses the oft-presumed hypothesis in a case study conducted in a
specialized federal context--the armed forces.

The military is a research

context rarely mined in social science research (Kourvetaris & Dobratz, 1977).
In fact, studies of any justice system stage in the armed forces have been
almost completely neglected.
The military is important to study because of its size and impact.

More

than 2.1 million Americans are on active duty (Department of Defense [DOD],
1984), a number larger than the populations of seventeen of our states (Bureau
of the Census [BOC], 1984).6 Further, more active duty personnel are in the
crime-prone risk group, 18-24 years, than 42 states (BOC, 1984; DOD, 1984).
The responsiveness of the system of justice in the armed forces
violations has been great.

to law

In 1983 alone, for example, more than 400,000

dispositional actions were taken by the system against active duty personnel
\J

(see Annual Report, 1984).

And it the critics of military justice are

correct, our citizens in uniform are subject to a second class system Qf
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justice {Sherill, 1970; Spak, 1984).
Notwithstanding criticisms of military justice generally, its explicit
plea bargaining practices have received high marks for visibility and the
contractual guarantees offered accused {Gray, 1978; McMenamin, 1971; Smith &
Dale, 1973).

Plea bargaining and sentencing in the militari, however, are

different in some respects from practices in civilian jurisdictions.
of this study highlights these differences.

Part I

Part II presents the research

setting, data set, design, and plan of action of the study.

Finally, Part III

examines the impact of plea bargaining on sentencing, using three measures of
sentence severity: A) discharge; B) in/out; and C) confinement length.
One unique feature of sentencing in the armed forces is that winners and
losers in plea bargaining can be identified.

The findings suggest that a

bargaining strategy was more advantageous to the prosecution than for the
accused for the first two decisions.

The analyses of the differential

hypothesis suggest that inequality of treatment is pronounced only at some
decisional stages and procedural levels.
.

·----

The results also furnish additional

evidence that variables other than dispositional mode are primarily
responsible for sentencing outcome.

Perhaps most importantly, the study

itself focuses a glimmer of light on the operations of a control system
shrouded in darkness.

I. Sentencing: Its Impact on Plea Bargaining·
Plea bargaining and sentencing in the armed forces are different from
such practices in other American criminal justice systems.

Who decides and

with what effects? These are questions whose answers differentiate the
military approach to sentencing and plea bargaining from that of civilian
jurisdictions. Six salient features separate military from civilian justice·:

4

1. Sentencing Authority.
sources:

Military sentencing authority resides in two

the court-martial and the convening authority (CA).

A sentence of a

court-martial must be reviewed by the officer who referred the case to trial
(the CA) before becoming final.

This officer has the power to approve or

change the nature or extent of any court-martial punishment; however, the CA
is prohibited from increasing the severity of the court sentence (Uniform Code
of Military Justice [UCMJ] 1983: Articles 60, 61, 64).
2. Jury sentencing.

Court-martial sentencing itself is unlike that in

most American civilian jurisdictions because jury sentencing has been retained
(Byers, 1968; Smith & Stevens, 1984). Only one authority may carried out both
adjud1cation and sentencing functions.

Unless an accused requests trial by

judge alone, findings and sentencing power is automatically conferred on a
military jury (trial by court members).7
3.

Sentence Suspension.

A court-martial does not have the

discretionary authority to suspend a sentence •. Suspension is exclusively
reserved for the CA (UCMJ, Article 71; Manual for Courts-Martial [MCM]: para.
88, 1968)

A court, however, can recommend to the CA that he or she consider a

suspension of sentence.

But, without any recommendation, a CA is free to

suspend a sentence or any part thereof.8
4.

Presentence information.

The military system lacks presentence

investigation reports and probation officers.

The court-martial sentencing

authority mµst rely upon the court participants for information which may be
presented in an adversary manner.

The nature of the ev1dence presented

depends on the type of plea offered.9
5.

Penalities. The punishments that an accused can receive distinguish

the military from civilian alternatives.

Depending upon both the jurisdiction

of the court and the maximum punishment authorized for a particular offense,
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offenders can be: (1) punitively ~ischarged from the service; (2) deprived of
their freedom;lO (3) made to forfeit pay and allowances; (4} reduced in
rank;ll (5) fined; and (6} reprimanded.

Other than deprivation of liberty and

fines, there are no clear, direct parallels in civilian justice.12
6.

Plea Bargaining.

The bifurcated sentencing structure directly

affects plea bargaining practices.

Military plea bargaining mainly involves a

sentencing agreement between the accused and the CA.

The agreement is usually

worked out before trial by the parties' representatives, the defense counsel
and the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA}, the legal advisor to the CA, or the SJA' s
subordinate prosecutorial staff.

Memorialized in writing, the agreement

becomes a contract in which the accused agrees to plead guilty and
acknowledges his waiver of rights.

In turn, the CA stipulates the terms of

· the purii shment:
The military judge at the court-martial conducts a providency inquiry
into the accused's plea of guilty.

The judge examines all parts of the

pretrial agreement (PTA} except for the quantum portion.

The judge does not

question the accused's understanding of the punishment agreement until after
the court-martial sentencing authority has announced its own independently

determined sentence.

If the accused's PTA sentence is less severe than that

given by the court, then the plea bargain agreement is executed.
Alternatively, if the court sentence is less severe than the PTA, then the
accused beats the deal
11

11
·

(PTA) and the court sentence is confirmed.

words of many military justice personnel interviewed, the accused had

In the
11

two

bites of .the apple," two shots at receiving sentence leniency by plea
bargaining.
Court selection i~ a critical decision for the bargainers and
prosecutors.

Courts develop reputations through time about the way they react
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to certain kinds of cases.13
court sentence.

Both parties are involved in predicting the

Each realizes that a favorable negotiated settlement is based

largely on estimating the court's assessment of the worth of the case.
Success for the prosecution means that they not only extracted a guilty plea
from the defendant, but that the negotiated agreement overestimated the court
sentence.

The shorter court sentence would then by approved by the CA.14 On

the other hand, the accused, as a bargaining strategy, is interested in
minimizing the severity of the approved sentence by drafting a deal which
"beats the court sentence"--the PTA is less severe than the court sentence.
When the agreement underestimated the court sentence, the servicemember has
truly received a discounted sentence.

The CA would be required to confirm the

lower negotiated sentence.15
II. Methods
A. Research Setting
The present research was conducted as part of a larger study of Army
---

c:ourt-marti al s.

The setting was Western Europe where U.S. Army Europe

(USAREUR) has jurisdictional control over approximately 200,000 troops
dispersed throughout nine countries.

USAREUR was selected for study because

it is a more complete social control system than that existing in the

continental United States where U.S. Supreme Court decisions have limited
m-i+i tal"-y

-j uri sdi cti on

to those offenses that are

II

service-connected" (See· for

example, O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 1969).
B. Sample
Much of the field work was devoted to examining accused case records
drawn from five of the eleven USAREUR jurisdictions.

Interviews were also

conducted with military judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys.

All

general (GCM) and bad conduct special (BCD Special) court-martials for one

7

twelve month period ending March 1978 were reviewed.

A GCM, the highest trial

court, can impose any punishment authorized by law, while the BCD Special, the
second highest trial court, may impose a bad conduct discharge only and
confinement not exceeding six months.
eliminated.

The few female cases in the study were

The sample size of convicted defendants consisted of 440 of which

297 were GCM proc~ssed and 143 were BCD Specials.
Pleaders were initially broken down into three groups: negotiated guilty
(PTA) pleaders (43.4 percent or 191 cases), nonnegotiated (straight) guilty
pleaders (13.2 percent or 58 cases), and not guilty pleaders (43.4 percent or
191 cases).

The straight guilty pleaders were separated out because their

plea represented implicit bargaining, cases that were easy to prove
(undisputed facts), or a recognition by defendants, unwn ling to deal, that
they were deserving of punishment (also see note 3).

Unlike explicit plea

bargaining which involved visible adversariness between the parties and direct
compromises over the sentence, implicit plea bargaining centered on
standardized understandings between defense attorney and judge over going
rates for classes of offenses without much, if any, consideration for the
particular charact~ristics.of a case.

Seventy percent of the sampled defendants were sentenced by judges.

GCM

guilty pleaders were more likely than not guilty pleaders to be sentenced by
judge alone (p. < .001).

Straight guilty pleaders were slightly more likely

than PTA pleaders to be sentenced by judge alone (p. = .14).

Pleading,

however, was not significantly associated with sentencing court at the BCD
level (p. = .09).

These findings may in part be attributed to the generally

held belief of USAREUR personnel that judicial sentencing is somewhat more
consistent tha~ court me~ber sentencing.16 · The perceived erratic sentencing
behavior of c-0urt members is to be avoided.

Plea bargainers have less to risk
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by being sentenced by court members than do straight guilty pleaders, who, if
they do not get sentencing leniency from the court, have nothing to fall back
on.

Choosing the sentencing authority carefully is a more critical task at

the GCM level than at the BCD Special level.
sentencing outcomes can be so variable.

The GCM stakes are higher, the_

The lower sentencing limits of a BCD

Special make the wrong sentencing authority decision comparatively less
costly.
C. Plan of Study
The interviews revealed that the punitive discharge and confinement at
hard 1abor are the two forms of punishment of major concern both to the
government and the accused at the GCM and BCD Special levels.
are examined.

These penalties

The thrust of the study focuses on three issues:

the kinds of discharge and confinement agreements the
negotiators received;
2. a comparison between negotiated agreements and the sentences
negotiators received from both the court and the convening
authority {CA);
3. a comparison of sentence -outcomes of negotiators to other
pleaders, detennining whether bargaining, controlling for other
. factors, has an independent effect on discharge and confinement
length.
·
1.

·---

1. .Variables

The dependent variables are the sentencing decisions: discharge type,
confinement {in/out), and confinement·length in months.

At each decision

point, the actions of the court and the CA are analyzed.

Four classes of

independent variables are included:

offender {age in years, race -

white/nonwhite); offense {weapon involvement, most serious charged offense,
crime type - violent, sexual, property, drug, and military)l7; system {number
of charged offenses, pretrial confinement, defense counsel military/civilian, sentencing court - court members/judge alone); and plea
type {negotiated gui.lty, straight guilty).

Categorical variables are dummy

9

coded.

The not guilty plea variable is omitted from analyses to serve as a

reference point for assessing the effects of guilty plea categories.

The

variables used have-been identifed as theoretically relevant to sentencing
decisions and will not be reviewed here.

Other predictors of seritenc~ outcome

such as prior record were not included because of the nature of the military
sample.18
2. Analytic Techniques
The statistical techniques used in analyzing the data include bivariate
. and multivariate analyses.
discharge decision.

Discriminant analysis is used to analyze the

This is the appropriate technique when the values of the

dependent variables represent clearly defined groups (Huberty, 1975)_.

OLS

regression analysis is used to analyze the sentence length decision.
Examination of the zero-order correlations showed no apparent
multicollinearity.

Trials were undertaken with different subsets of

independent variables to identify the smallest -set of- variables \<Jith the
fewest missing-cases that produced the highest multiple correlation squared.
'--~

Variables which did not add more than a trace to the explained variance were
eliminated.

Plea type, however, was always introduced in the trial runs to

increase its opportunity to influence outcome.

Other than plea type, we

report results only for significant variables for each of the two court
levels.
III. Sentencing Outcomes
A. Discharge Decision
1. Plea Bargain Agreements
Pretrial agreements to limit discharge were found in 188 of the 191 plea
bargained cases.

To capture the variety of discharge agreements, the

agreements were initially classified into seven categories that were, in a
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rough sense, agreements from the most to the least severe outcome:

(1)

dishonorable discharge (DD); (2) suspend DD (3) bad conduct discharge (BCD);
(4) suspend BCD; (5) suspend any discharge; (6) no discharge; and (7) approved
as adjudged.19 The results of thi~ classification scheme showed that there
were marked differences between GCM and BCD Special bargainers.

First, nearly

three-fourths (74 percent) of the GCM pleaders but only about a fifth (21
percent) of BCD Special bargainers agreed to a discharge.
percent of the GCMers agreed to a DD.

Also, almost 40

Secondly, the GCM bargainers were much

less likely to obtain suspensions (6 percent to 40 percent) and to negotiate
for no discharge (2 percent to 14 percent).

Thirdly, slightly fewer GCM cases

were agreements to have the court adjudge the sentence (18 percent to 24
percent).

In short, the GCM offenders were less likely t.o receive sentencing

leniency.
These findings raise at least three questions.

Why were some bargainers

agreeable to receiving the most serious discharge? Why were more BCD Special
bargainers more likely to obtain suspensions? Why were other bargainers
willing to put their discharge fate exclusively in the courts' hands? Based
on the interviews, we founq four primary reasons for these discharge outcomes:
1.

The accused was not that interested in the discharge portion of
hi•s agreement.
2.· · The government believed that. he deserved either a particular
discharge label or a second chance.
3. The government refused to negotiate the discharge.
4. The court track record controlled the parties' negotiation
practices.
Those who negotiated for a discharge, especially the most severe
discharge, the DD, were, as a group, mor~ preoccupied with limiting their
sentence in other respects such as confinement than in minimizing the severity
of the discharge.

Although the distinction between a DD and a BCD was

meaningful to some military authorities, the greater stigmatization allegedly

11

associated with a dishonorable discharge was lost on many accused interested
only in getting out of the Army.20

Even those offenders who were concerned

about the more damaging label, however, occassionally met with government
resistance to reduce it.

Some prosecutorial agents believed that ::>"-:·?--the

accused did deserve,·:\_the more opprobrious label.

They saw symbolic value in

characterizing those who committed the equivalent of serious felonies with a
DD.
Suspensions were primarily from the BCD Special group.
committed less serious offenses and were considered more

11

These offenders

salvageable. 11

Soldiers wanted suspensions because of their time in service and, sometimes,
age, giving them a vested interest in finishing out their military careers.21
The approved as adjudged discharges were basically from one jurisdiction (86
percent).

The prosecutors there believed, as a matter of policy, that it was

more appropriate for the court fa determine the discharge, if any, to give to
the accused.

The military was much more interested itself in negotiating

confinement length.

As the SJA there stated,

11

1 prefer to deal with time

only. 11
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a sentencing court that had
developed a record of what a case was worth would largely determine the kind
of PTA discharge, if any, an accused would receive.

For example, if a

sentencing court had in similarly situated cases given accused no discharge,
then the best the government could probably hope for was a suspended discharge
in a PTA.

Time and again interviewed participants suggested that it was the

court's assessment that fixed .the outer bounds of the sentencing agreement.
To identify those variables significantly related to agreement outcome,
discriminant analysis was used.

GCM discharge agreement, the dependent

variable, was recoded into three groups with suspensions collapsed into its
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:defi~able group: DD (1,2), BCD (3;4}, and No Discharge (5,6).
adjudged cases were eliminated.

The approved as

Tables la through le identify a range of

discriminant features useful in interpreting _the discharge variable.

Table 4a

reports on the relative contribution of variables to significant changes in
Rao 1 i V.

Nine out of 13 variables in the set were weeded out as not producing

a significant increase in Rao 1 s V.
significant discriminati~g power.

Four varia~es together were found to have
Table lb shows that both functions

significantly separated the groups.

The second function, however, is less

important than the first (eisenvalue percentage}.
The nature of the first discriminant plane may be ascertained in a
variety ·of ways.

In

Table lb, the canonical coefficient is weak.

The

proportion of variance in the first function that is shared with the variance
in the groups in about 18 percent.

The standardized coefficients in Table le

shows that offense related nffenses are important in structuring the discharge
choice.

System fai::tors, however, al~,9 moderately influenced :the decision.

The group centroids! indicate that :th~ significant chi-square (x 2) is -mostly /
attributed to distance in the dimensional space between the BCD discharge and
the other two discharge· gra.ups, especially the dishonorable discharge group.
Examining the relative location of the group cent.raids in the first
. function and focusing on the si~ns of the standardized coefficients for the
known sepatatioh among the grbups, it appears, in order of importance, that an
increase in offense seriousness, ·drug offenses, pretrial confinement, and
military defen~e counsel contributed to the greatest distance among the
groups.

The ·unstandardized coefficients suggest that bargainers who committed

more serious offenses, drug offenses, were not in pretrial confinement, and retained civilian defense counsel were more likely to receive a BCD discharge.
C

Alternatively, ~hose bargainers charged ~ith less serious offenses are most
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likely to receive no discharge, as are bargainers charged with nondrug
offenses, in pretrial confinement, and who elected to be represented by
military defense counsel.
The second discriminant function shows an even weaker canonical
coefficient (cc2 = .08).

The standardized coefficients in Table le suggest

that system factors contribute the most to the discrimination.

The group

centroids indicate that the significant chi-square (x2) is mostly attributed,
to distance in the function space between the dishonorable discharge and both
the BCD and no discharge groups.
The group centroids in the second function and the signs of the
standardized coefficients shows a different order of precedence among the
variables.

The single most important factor affecting the discharge choice is

civilian defense counsel.
loading.

An absence of pretrial confinement has a moderate

To a much lesser extent, drug offenses also contribued_to separating

the groups, particularly between the DD and BCD- groups.

The unstandardized

coefficients indicate that military defense counsel, pretrial confinement,
nondrug offenses, and more serious offenses are more related to a DD.
While neither function explained much of the variance, these findings

do.

indicate that system factors have a greater impact on receiving the most
severe agreement, and offense factors have a greater impact on whether to
retain or discharge bargainers.
of serious offenses out.

Military authorities wantbargainers accused

Their concern over serious drugs abusers and

traffickers translates into discharges as well.

It also appears that

bargainers who hired ~ivilian counsel were concerned with the kind of
discharge label they would receive.

Pretrial confinement findings may

indicate that bargainers were perceived as either dangerous, or perhaps,
immature, requiring close supervision.

\

\

\
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Insert Tables la through le about here

2. Court Plea Bargaining Outcomes
The question then arises of how well the plea bargainers fared in court
in comparison to their agreed upon negotiated discharges.

□.id

they "beat" the

discharge deal by receiving a lower court sentence outcome than that to which
they had contracted (government wins)? Alternatively, did they "beat" the
court sentence by negotiating for a lower discharge outcome than that handed
down by the court (accused wins)?
The GCM court sentenced the bargainers (6=145) to a DD in 31 percent, to
a BCD in 50 percent (of which 10 percent were ~commendations to suspend the.
.

- -

----=----

--'.;:'_"

- -

BCD) while~the remaining 19 percent received no discharge.

-- -

---

-- - --

-

To compare

✓

discharge agreement to court discharge outcome, the approved as adjudged cases
were excluded.

The relationship then between PTA and court discharge outcome

was found to be statistically significant and showed a moderate degree of
1

association (Kendal1 s tau c

= .35, n = 119, p.

< .001):

those who negotiated

a particular discharge agreement were more likely to receive from the court

that specific discharge outcome.

Further, the results indicated which·

bargainers beat the deal or the court . sentence.

Those who agreed to the most

'

severe discharge, the DD, were also the most successful in beating the
agreement:

52 percent.22. Those who had contracted for the less serious BCD

were less successful at beating the deal:
discharge.

only 18 percent received no

On the other hand, 16 percent of the bargained BCD cases beat the

court sentence of a DD.

Those few who agreed to a suspension or no discharge·

did do slightly better 1t ~ourt~23 In short, 37 percent of the accused beat
the deal (court sentence less than deal) apd only 8 percent of the accused
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beat the court sentence (deal less than court sentence,.
The BCD Special court sentenced 44 percent to a BCD, 16 percent to a BCD
with a recommendation for suspension and 40 percent to no discharge ( n=43).
Without the approved as adjudged cases, however, 50 percent received BCDs, 19
percent were given a BCD with a recommendation for suspension, and 31 percent
received no discharge.

The relationship between agreement and court outcome

was strong for this smaller group who faced fewer options (Kendall's tau c
.68, n

=

32, p. < .01).

Few of the cases were affected by the PTA:

=

16

percent beat the deal and only 3 percent beat the court sentence.24
The results were that 39 percent of the 151 cases in which the accused
had agreed to a particular discharge outcome received some form of discharge
modification by bargaining.

Of these affected cases, 83 percent were ones in

which the accused beat the discharge deal.

The government was able to

persuade the accused to plead guilty and to accept. a more severe discharge
outcome than that given by the court.

This suggests that the government was

more successful in discharge negotiating than the accused were, especially at
·--....__

the GCM level.

It was also easier for the GCM bargainers to beat a particular

type of negotiated discharge than to beat any discharge at all.25

But the

discharge agreement for the majority of plea bargainers failed to influence
the court discharge outcome.

Those who negotiated for a particular outcome

w~re more likely to receive that court outcome than any other.

The government

even made out fairly well in the approved as adjudged group: most of the more
serious GCM bargainers were discharged, and the less serious BCD Special
negotiators were retainect.26
3. Convening Authority (CA) Plea Bargaining Outcomes
Based on the PTA and court sentence, the CA was required to take action
affirming or reducing the court sentence.

Among the GCM plea bargainers, 25 ,

16

percent received a DD, 55 percent received a BCD, and 20 percent were not
discharged.27

At t~e BCD Special level, the CA gave 57 percent a BCD (40

percent of which were suspensions), and 43 percent were not discharged.28 All
of the approved as adjudged group received the court sentence.
A comparison was made between CA action and both court sentence and PTA
at the GCM and BCD Special level.

The findings suggested that the CA sentence

was more aligned with the court sentence than with the PTA at the GCM level,29
while there were practically no differences between CA sentence and both court
sentence and PTA at the BCD Special level.30 The agreed discharge then had
little affect on final CA discharge outcome for most plea bargainers.
4. Comparison of Plea Bargainers to Other Pleading Court Outcomes
The next question focused on how well the bargainers made out in court in
comparison to other pleaders.

To what extent were they credited for pleading

guilty in comparison to other pleaders?

If one accepts the notion that

pleading guilty would be rewarded with sentencing leniency since it expedites
the business of the court, then the bargainers, in comparison to the not
guilty pleaders, ought to be less likely to receive the most severe discharge
outcome.
First we examined the bivariate relationship between pleading and court
discharge outcomes separately at the GCM and BCD Special levels.
relationships were statistically significant.

The

Surprisingly however, we found

that the bargainers seem to be more likely to receive the most severe
discharge outcome.
The GCM research showed that 31 percent of the plea bargainers as opposed
to 16 percent of the not guilty pleaders and 9 percent of the straight guilty
pleaders received DDs.

The greatest percentage difference (epsilon or E) was

between the.plea bargainers and the straight guilty pleaders (E

=

22 percent).
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Although the percentage difference between the not guilty and -straight guilty
pleaaers .w~s not great (7 percent}, the straight guilty pleaders were least
likely to receive a DD.
receive a BCD

(E

But straight guilty pleaders were most likely to

=20 percent}.

Further, rather than the plea bargainers

being more likely to receive discharge leniency, the not guilty pleaders were
more likely to receive no discharge

(E

= 20 percent) (x2 = 15.38, 4df, p. <

.01} (n = 296}.

At the BCD Special level, findings were quite similar:

60 percent of the

plea bargainers in comparison to 40 percent of the not guilty pleaders and 35
percent of the straight guilty pleaders received a BCD.

The greatest BCD

percentage difference was again between the plea bargainers and the straight
guilty pleaders (E = 25 percent) (x2 = .599, 2df, p. < .05} (n = 144}.
It seems then that straight guilty pleaders were least likely and
bargainers most likely to receive the most severe discharge.
pleaders appear to do the best.

Not guilty

Before any confidence can be placed in such

findings, however, it is. necessary to introduce controls for relevant other
variables in order to further interpret these findings.

In an effort to

assess more accurately the.relationship, the data were analyzed further
through the use of discriminant analysis.
In using the discriminant technique with the GCM cases, the dependent
variable was treated as a trichotomous choice of the three outcomes.

Table 2a

reports that nine variables 'together were found to produced a significant
increase in Rae's V.

While pleading guilty without a PTA significantly

changed Rae's V, a negotiated guilty plea did not.

Table 2b shows that while

both functions significantly separated the groups, the ~econd function is much
less important than the first (eigenvalue percentage).
The canonical coefficient of the first plane in Table 2b is moderate (35
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percent).

The standardized coefficients in Table 2c shows that offense

related factors dominate, evidenced by their high loadings.
has a moderate loading.

Sentencing court

But the effects of straight guiley pleas minimally

contributed to the significant discrimination.

An examination of the group

centroids indicates that the first function separates the no discharge from
the other two discharge groups, especially the dishonorable discharge group.
Based on the group centroids and the signs of the standardized
coefficients in the first function, Table 2c shows, in order of importance,
that an increase in the seriousness of offense, weapon involvement, nonviolent
offenses, judge alone sentencing, drug and sexual offenses, a decrease in the
age of the offender, an increase in the number of charges, and not pleading
straight guilty contributed to the greatest distance among the groups.

The

unstandardized coefficients suggest that less serious offenses, nonweapon
involvement, violent offenses, court member sentencing, nondrug and nonsexual
offenses, older offenders, fewer charges, and an absence of a straight guilty
plea are more associated with no discharge.
The canonical coefficient of the second function is weak {cc2 = .11).
The standardized coefficients in Table 2c suggest that sexual offenses
contribute the most to the discrimination, and most serious offense the least.
By examining the group centroids, we observe that the first function clearly
discriminates between between the dishonorable discharge and both the BCD and
no discharge groups.
The group centroids in the second function and the signs of the
standardized coefficients show a different order of precedence among t~e
variables.

The single most important factor affecting the tlischarge choice is

sexual offense.

To a much lesser extent, violent offenses, an increase in

age, nondrug offenses, an aosence of straight guilty pleas, nonweapon
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involvement, an increase in the charges, court member sentencing, and a
decrease in the seriousness of the charges contributed to the greatest
distance among the groups, particularly between the DD and BCD groups.

The

unstandardized coefficients indicate.that sexual and violent offenses, older
offenders, nondrug offenses, not pleading straight guilty, weapon involvement,
more charges, court member sentencing, and more serious offenses are more
related to a DD.31.

Insert Tables 2a through 2c about here

The results of the analysis of the two functions are somewhat similar.
The major factors affecting discharge decisions are the type and character of
offense.

The primary interest, however, in using the discriminant model is to

ascertain whether type of plea has a significant effect.
plea had such an impact.

Only straight guilty

A straight guilty plea is neither linked to the no

discharge or, especially, the dishonorable discharge group.32

The

multivariate analysis lends support to the original zero order relationship
that pleading guilty without a PTA is related to greater leniency (a BCb
outcome) at the GCM level.

The negotiated variable, while not making a ·

significant contribution to the separation, is in the expected direction of
receiving a harsher outcome as compared to not guilty pleading ( reference
group).
Tables 3a and 3b present the analysts of the BCD discharge cases.

Here

only three variables significantly separated the groups and they explain a
smaller proportion of the variance.

Cases resulting in the BCD discharge are

most likely to be nonviolent offenses, negotiated pleas of guilty, and to
involve offenders in pretrial confinement.

Straight guilty pleas, while not a
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significant variable, is again in the expected direction: no discharge.

Insert Tables 3a and 3b about here

5. Comparison of Convening Authority (CA) Outcomes of Plea Bargainers to
Others
'
If the plea bargainers fared relatively badly in court, it was.expected
that the influence of the PTA would at least cause some flatness in the
percentage differences among the pleaders when the CA took action.

While only

the GCM plea bargainers received reductions in discharge sentence, those
changes were not substantial enough, however, to offset the discharge
outcomes.33 The plea bargainers were still more likely to receive a DD.34 At
the BCD Special level, again only the plea barg~iners received reduction in
discharge sentence; the other two plead~rs' court sentencing were approved as
adjudged.35 The reductions made did not materially c~ange the plea percentage
outcomes and, therefore, the plea bargainers were still more likely to receive
BCDs.36
The convening authority decisions. were again tested using discriminant
function analysis.

Tables 4a through 4c focus on the GCM decisions •. Seven

variables were found to make significant changes in Rao's V (Table 4a).

The

variables differed from the court discharge outcome in not including number of
charges, age, and straight guilty pleas.

Pretrial confinement status,

however, did enter the GCM discriminant model as it did in the agreement
analysis (Table 1).

Table 4b again shows that both functions significantly

separated the group in approximately the same way as was in the court analysis
(Table 2b).

Also, the proportion of variance explained in each function is

about the same with much of the variation due to offense related factors and
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the remainder attributable to system variables.

Similarly, the group

centroids indicate that the significant chi-square (X2) is primarily
attributed to distance in the first function space between no discharge and
the other two discharge groups, and in the second function space between the
dishonorable discharge ~nd both the BCD discharge and no discharge groups
(Table 4c).

Cases resulting in no discharge are least likely to be weapon

related or serious offenses.

Cases resulting in a dishonorable discharge are

most likely to be sexual offenses.

Unlike the court outcomes, however,

neither type of plea significantly affected the GCM discharge decision.

But

the straight guilty pleaders were least likely to receive a DD.

Insert Tables 4a through 4c about here

At the BCD level plea bargainers continue to be significantly penalized.
Tables 5a and 5b report that only two variables significantly di_scriminated
among the groups.

Offenders charged with violent offenses were more likely to

be retained in the service while bargainers were more likely to receive a BCD.

Insert Tables 5a and 5b about here

6.

Discussion of Findings
The expected differential sentencing hypothesis for discharges is not

supported by these findings.

Negotiators were not treated more leniently than

other pleaders. The discharge sentence, however, has no exact equivalent in
civilian justice.
impact.
ri·ght.37

Denaturalization and banishment may come the closest in

A discharge decision then is a solemn act, important in its own
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The findings may be related to a number of factors.

First, those

pleading guilty, especially without a PTA, were more likely to be sentenced by
judges than by court members.

The judge was aware of those who pleaded guilty

with or without a PTA.38 Since the centerpiece of military plea bargaining is
the sentencing agreement, the judge probably thought that the accused had
obtained a sentencing agreement from the CA that reflected in some manner his
prior sentencing decisions and, consequently, the judge felt free to impose
the discharge sentence that the accused deserved for the offenses to which he
had pleaded guilty.
Secondly, the judge was consuming much energy 11 dotting every i and
crossing every t 11 during the providency inquiry into the guilty plea.39
Judges were also aware that they could not dispose of the bargained cases very
quickly.

In fact, one judge suggested that the guilty plea PTA cases were

taking as much time to process as some simple contested cases.

On the other

hand, the straight guilty pleas were not as time consuming as the negotiated
ones, and sentencing agents probably realized that a straight gui-lty plea
accused was taking a considerable risk by coming into court and pleading
guilty without an agreement.

It is in this context that sentencing severity

v1as less focused on the straight guilty pleaders.
Thirdly, the court outcomes associated with the not guilty pleaders,
especially the tendency of the GCM not guilty pleaders to be more likely to
receive no discharge, can probably be explained by identifying their personal
attributes.

They tended to be older and to have more time in service.

It is

likely that those contesting the charges were doing so because they riot only
did not want to be found_ guilty, but if found guilty, did not want to be
thrown out'of the Army.

They had more to lose by being discharged.

The

court, in fact, was made well aware of these considerations through defense
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counsel presentations during sentencing.
Finally, the convening authority findings substantially mirror the court
actions.
decisions.

Apparently the CA was unwilling to lessen the severity of court
One can infer that the bargainers, especially those at the BCD

level, were offenders that both the court and the CA wanted to eliminate from
further service.

Nevertheless, these findings are merely suggestive and must

be interpreted with care since the much of the variance remains unexplained.
B. Deprivation of Liberty
1. Plea Bargain Agreements
All of the plea bargainers ,fur whom information was available about
deprivation of liberty negotiations, 186 cases, were facing a confinement
sentence for the charges against them.

As measured by the number who

negotiated for no confinement, the accuseds' negotiations, to say the least,
proved to be less than satisfactory.

None were able to negotiate a

nonconfinement agreement.40
2. Court Plea Bargaining Outcomes
The court sentenced 89 percent to confinement, with the remaining 11
percent receiving restriction, hard labor without confinement, and no
confinement.41 More GCM bargainers were given confinement than were BCD
Special negotiators (92 percent to 78 percent), and approximately the same
percent of GCM ~nd BCD Special plea bargainers received no deprivation of
liberty (6 percent).42
By comparing the deprivation of liberty agreement to court sentence, the
study found that even more than the discharge outcome, few plea agreements
affected court sentencing one way or another.

Only 10 percent of the

deprivation of liberty agreements (excluding approved as adjudged agreements)
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influenced the court decisions.

Of this very small group, 88 percent were

sentences in which the accused beat the deal.43

In short, as with the

discharge outcome, the bargain was much more to the advantage of government
than to the accused.44
3. Convening Authority (CA) Plea Bargaining Outcomes·
As with the court, the CA sentenced 89 percent to confinement.

Again the

remaining 11 percent is divided among those who received restriction, hard
labor without confinement, or no confinement.
4. Comparison of Plea Bargainers to Other Pleading Court Outcomes
All of the accused found guilty were at risk to receive confinement for
the of,fenses for which they were convicted.

The court sentence 86 percent to

confinement, seven percent to either restriction or hard labor without
confinement, and seven percent received no liberty deprivation.45 Those
processed at the GCM level were slightly more likely to receive confinement
than those processed at the BCD Special level (89 percent to 81

percent) (p <

·-~

.05).46
Examining the confinement differences among the pleaders in the context :of!
what was reported earlier about the discharge outcomes, we expected that the
bargainers would again fare the worst by being more likely to receive
confinement.

Interestingly though, the relationship between pleading and

court confinement outcome was not statistically significant for the total
court-martial sample, nor at either of the procedural levels:

89 percent of

the plea bargainers, 82 percent of the not guilty pleaders and 90 percent of
the straight guilty pleaders received a sentence to confinement.
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5. Comparison of Convening Authority (CA) Outcomes of Plea Barga1ners to
Others
Given the lack of influence of the liberty deprivation agreement on court
sentence, we now expected to find that the CA s confinement sentence would
1

model that of the court sentence.

Indeed it did •. The relationship between

court and CA decision was almost perfect for the total court-martial sample
(tau c- .97) as well as for each of the procedural levels.

The percentages

for confinement, restriction or hard labor without confinement, and no
confinement remained the same as the court.

Neither were many differences

found among the pleaders sentenced to confinement.47 The differential
sentencing hypothesis, therefore, is rejected for the confinement decision.
6. Discussion of Findings
The preference of the decision makers for confinement for all pleaders
may be attributed in part to the sentencing alternatives available in the
military, as well as the justice agent views toward the objectives of military
justice.

Relatively few.statutory sentencing choices are open to a

court-martial.

Suspension, as mentioned earlier~ is not an option. The court

can only recommend a suspension to the CA.

Some justice agents suggested that

the CA does not want to suspend all the confinement since, absent a punitive
discharge, these relatively serious offenders, convicted at the two highest
court-martial forums, would then be returned to their military organizations.
This would be problematic for the offender's immediate commander because there
are no probationary services in the military.

The commander would be required

to supervise the accused, diverting his attention and that of his staff and
unit from their mission responsibilities.
Another concern is that the sentencing of many accused to other than
confinement is inconsistent with the goals of military sentencing.

Accardi ng
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to the interviews, there are two primary objectives of confinement sentencing:
rehabilitation and deterrence.

Both are tied together to a core function of

mil-itary justice, the mai11tenance of discipl_ine in the armed forces.48.
\

Rehabilitation is to be accomplished by sending those who are

11

salvageable

11

and serving less than six months to the institution responsible for restoring
malefactors. - This facility is an intensive type of boot -camp, that is,
treatment of offenders consists of marching and polishing, in other words,
soldiering.49 For the more serious offenders, that is, those sentenced to
longer confinement--terms, especially ave~ -six months, rehabilitation _i_s to
- take place atXort:Leavenworth, Kansas.

Typically, the SJAs suggested that the:-

·accused enrolls in vocational programs or gets some sort of counseling
there.SO
But more importantly for many justice authorities, the second objectiv·e,
deterrence, is a greater concern.

Deterrence is primarily perceived from a

affects others in the
general deterrence framework of how th~·punishment
':
-_

command, or, in the words of one SJA, the

11

telegraph effect,

11

that is, what

you- are communicating to the troops by the kind of punishment given to
offenders.

Justice age~ts .believ~ that to return an accused to his unit with

a suspended confinement sentence or restriction, for e_xampl e, would undercut
the .deterrence objective since all in the unit may see that the accused just
received a "sl,ap on 'the wrist.

11

Other potential offenders would be encouraged

while victims, potential victims, or law abiding solidiers would be
de~orali~ed. - But the most devastating result of using rionconfinement
alternatives would be that discipline would break down, inhibiting the command
from achieving the readiness necessary to deter potential agressor nations
from acting against U.S. interest.

- (
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C. Confinement Length Decision
1. Plea Bargain Agreements (PTAs)

The GCM bargainers faced a mean maximum confinement length sentence of
125.1 months.

The maximum confinement length for the BCD Special bargainers

had a ceiling of six months.51 While the bargainers were unable to negotiate
a nonconfinement sentence with the CA, they were successful in negotiating
confinement length agreements.

Almost all the bargainers negotiated on

sentence length.52 Eighty accused negotiated for a partial suspension of
confinement length.53 The mean confinement length negotiated, omitting the
suspended portion of the agreement, for the GCM bargainers was 21.1 months and
for the BCD Special bargainers was 3.4 months.
To determine those variables significantly related to length of.
confinement agreements, multiple regression was used with GCM confinement
length in months as the dependent variable.54 A set of four variables were
identified which contributed the most to explaining the proportion of
-

v~riation in confinement length:

sexual offense, weapon involvement in the

criminal act, civilian defense counsel, and number of charges.

Table 6

reports that the variance percentage explained by these variables was
.I
1y 32 percent.
approx1fate

Sexual offenses accounted for over ha l f of the

explained variance and had by far far·the highest beta (.43).

Those who were

accused of a sexual crime, either possessed or used a weapon, were represented
by civilian defense counsel, and had more charges were more likely to have
negotiated more severe confinement length agreements.

Insert Table 6 about here

These findings suggest that the government took sexual offenses and
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weapon involvement very seriously and· thought the court would too.

The SJAs

had implied that acc~sed were more receptive to plea bargaining when both the
evidence was strong and the charged offense could result in considerable time.
Those negotiators with more charges had a greater risk of receiving more
time.55

One may infer than the typical sexual offender was dead on the

evidence (weapon recovered?) and/or was facing a potential sentence that was
unacceptable.56 These are sufficient circumstances for mounting pressure to
cut losses and to accept a relatively lengthy confinement agreement.

Also,

the sentencing history of court decision makers was another consideration
weighing heavily on accused's mind.

The court would most likely hand down a

more severe punishment than the agreement sentence if the accused lost at
trial.
The role of civilian defense counsel is of considerable importance.
Accused probably retained private attorney not only because he could afford
one,57, but because he thought civilian rather than military counsel could be
trusted to fight for the best deal.

Yet, apparently civilian counsel was not

·-~

able to secure the most advantageous deals.

Perhaps one reason may have been

unfamiliarity with the system s operation which hampered advice given to
1

,

clients about negotiations with the military.
generic reason.

But there may be an even more

The ctvilian counsel~ by defiriition, is.an outsider not

directly tied into the military culture, its norms, or sanctions.

Since

civilians were perceived as not subject to the rules of military society or
authority, justice authorities may sanction or keep them in line through
actions taken against their clients.58
Finally, these findings were interesting since, other than number of
charges, none of the variables associated with the decision to plea bargain
were found to be significantly related to confinement length agreements
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(Keveles, 1984).

This indicates that the factors that discriminate between

the plea bargainers and nonplea bargainers were not helpful in understanding
which of the plea bargainers would be able to negotiate the best or worst
confinement length deal.
2. Court Plea Bargaining Outcomes
The court sentenced the GCM bargainers to a mean confinement length of
31.6 months and the BCD Special bargainers to 3.6 months.59

It would appear

then that a significant number of the agreements would modify or be changed by
the court ~entences.

They did:

98 percent of the 169 confinement length

agreements in which the court sentenced the plea bargainers to confinement
were affected by the court sentence.

Of this large group, 65 percent were

sentences in which the accused beat the court sentence.

The GCM bargainers

were significantly more likely to beat the court sentence than the BCD Special
bargainers were (59 percent to 36 percent)(Pearson's r = -.19, p. < .01).

On

the other hand, although the BCD Special bargainers were slightly more likely
·~

tb beat the deal than the GCM bargainers were (36 percent to 27 percent), the
percentage difference was not statistically significant (Pearson's r
=

.14).

=

.07, p.

By more bargainers beating the court sentence, especially those

processed at the GCM level, it may be said that the bargained agreement worked
better for the accused than for the government.
3. Convening Authority (CA) Plea Bargaining .Outcomes
The CA action on the bargainers, reflecting the considerable changes
brought about by the agreements and the court sentences, resulted in mean
confinement length sentences of 18.5 months for the GCM bargainers and 2.9
months for the BCD Special bargainers.
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4. Comparison of Pl~a Bargainers to Other Pleading Court Outcomes
The mean maximum confinement length facing the GCM accused was 109
months.

The plea bargainers sentenced to confinement tended to face

considerably more prison time (122 months) than either the not guilty (95
months) or straight guilty pleaders (97 months) did.60 The mean GCM court
sentence was 29.6 months.

Not guilty pleaders received the least amount of

time (25.6) while straight guilty pleaders received slightly more time (33.5)
than did plea bargainers (31.6).
Special level.

A different pattern emerges at the BCD

This lower court sentenced their defendants to a mean 3.7

months of confinement.

Here, plea bargainers were sentenced to the shortest

term (3.6), straight guilty pleaders again received the most severe sentence
(3.9), while not guilty pleaders were in the middle (3.7 months).

These

findings suggest that only the BCD Special bargainers were given credit by the
court for their plea.

It also appears that pleading guilty without a pretrial

agreement was not a very successful strategy to follow.61
·-~

Regression analyses were performed on each of the procedural levels
separately.

The results showed that court confinement length was

significantly related to five variables at the GCM level (Table
variables at the BCD Special level (Table 8).

7),

and three

Examination of the standardized

regression coefficients indicated that the greatest proportion of the variance
in sentence length is explained by sexual offense for GCM cases and offense
seriousness for BCD Special cases.

Offense seriousness was the only variable

that was significantly at both procedural levels, underlining the importance
of this variable generally in court-martial sentencing.

The more serious the

charge, the more.time one receiving from the court.
Interestingly, other than offense seriousness, those variables
significantly related to GCM court outcome were also significant for GCM
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confinement length agreement.

This suggests a number of possibilities.

First, the government appeared to be correct in both predicting that the court
would take sexual offenses and weapon involvement quite seriously and
prevailing upon defendants to accept the military's offered agreement as
insurance against an even more severe court outcome.

Secondly, as the number

~f charges increased, offenders did receive a longer sentence.

Thirdly, since

defense counsel can help accused during sentencing by arguing for ex-tenuati ng
and miti gating circumstances, whatever arguments and reasoning civilian
counsel used did not prevent accused from getting severe court sentences.62
Finally, ~hile offense seriousne~s was not signifjcantly related to duration
agreements, it was·!s-ignifica-ntly related to those who selected to plea bargain:
in the-first place (Keveles~ 1984), indicating that the bargainers were
attuned to this aspect of court sentencing.
Unlike the GCM court, sentencing authority and pretrial liberty status
played significant parts in duratio_n <?~tcomes at the BCD Special level./

Jurors handed down longer sentences than judges did within the short
confinement range of the BCD Special court.

Pretrial detention indicated that

these were offenders who were perceived to need the close supervision of
confin~ment because of their tendency to flee (go AWOL).
Again, however, our primary interest is the plea type variables. · Neither
variable had a significant effect.

This finding of no sentencing differences

on the basis of plea suggests uniformity in sentencing across plea groups.
Nevertheless, the unstandardized coefficients deserve some attentio~.

GCM

bargainers received sentences more than 5 months and straight guilty pleaders
more than 9 months longer than not guilty pleaders (reference group).

BCD

Special bargajners, however, received sentences that was slightly less than
>

not guilty pTeaders.

Straight guilty pleaders continued to receive more time

32

than not guilty pleaders.

The directional influence of bargaining was

opposite for the two courts:

GCM bargaining was related to receiving more

confinement, while BCD Special bargaining was related to receiving less time
in comparison to not guilty pleaders.

Insert Tables 7 and 8 about here

5. Comparison of Convening Authority (CA) Outcomes of Plea Bargainers to
Others
The CA action at both procedural levels resulted in the bargainers
receiving the greatest sentencing leniency.

Mean confinement terms of 18.5

months were given to bargainers, 23.0 months to not guilty pleaders, and 33.4
months to straight guilty pleaders.

Even the BCD Special plea bargainers who

had already received sentencing leniency from the court received a further
reduction: 2.9 months to bargainers, 3.7 months-to not guilty pleaders, and
3.9 months to straight guilty pleaders.63
Regression analyses performed with the GCM cases (Table 9) showed results
similar to the court outcome.

In fact, the only statistically significant

differences between GCM court and CA sentence are that offense seriousness is
not an independent consideration in CA decisions, while sentencing agent and
straight guilty pleas are.

Compared with not guilty pleas, pleading guilty

without a pretrial agreement results in the longest confinem~nt term (an
increase of 14 months).
sentence length.

Again, bargaining does not affect significantly

Nevertheless, the direction of the bargaining variable is

opposite to that given by the GCM court.

Negotiating a pretrial agreement

results in marginally greater leniency than pleading not guilty.

This finding

is consistent with earlier ones that suggest that the influence of PTAs on CA
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confinement length would tend to reduce the influence of court sentence.
At the BCD Special level (Table 12)~ relatively more of the variance is
explained than that at the court-martial (R2

=

.31 vs. 20).

Three out of the

four significant variables are the same as those in the court sentence
outcome.

Nevertheless, an additional variables achieves significance for the

first time: plea bargaining.

Pleading guilty with a pretrial agreement

results in the shortest prison sentence.
sentencing favors the use of PTAs.

Unlike GCMs, the BCD Special

The differential sentencing ~pothesis is

unequivocally supported for BCD Special confinement length decisions.

Insert Tables 9 and 10 about here

6. Discussion of Findings
Multivariate research on the impact of plea on sentencing has produced
contradictory findings.

Eisenstein &Jacob (1977) found that pleading method

has little real effect on sentence type or length once offense, accused, and
other characteristics are taken into accounted.

On the other hand, Brereton &

Casper (1981: 52) in their study of sentence type did find differences among
pleaders.

They specifically criticized Eisenstein &Jacob's methodology.

Brereton & Casper argue that Eisenstein &Jacob had mis-specified the issue.
The sentencing differential hypothesis does not posit that pleading method
more or less strongly related 11 to sentencing than are other variables.

11

From

their view, it is readily understandable that seriousness of offense will be
the most important factor in most situations.

The appropriate question for

them is whether or not pleading method 11 makes a difference, 11 other things
being equal.

is
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Brereton &Caspar's reliance on "common sense 11 in their argument is
disquieting.
conditions.
nonsense."

Common sense notions must be carefully tested under various
As Hagan (1982: 2) has asserted: "Sometimes common sense is
Indeed, Talarico (1979) found that offense severity had a minimal

impact while plea carried great weight in sentence classification.

Cohen et

al. (1985) found that there wasn't any statfstically significant relationship
between offense severity and likelihood of incarceration.

The multivariate

findings of this study do reaffinn the importance of charge seriousness under
most circumstances, thou~h clearly not the major factor in this GCM sentencing
decision.64 But the results also indicate that plea bargaining makes a
difference in the particular instance of BCD Special processing.
These findings at the GCM and BCD Special levels for court-martial
sentencing and CA action not only target in on the important variables and
define the role of plea bargaining in military sentencing.

The results also

demonstrate that several other variables often considered by some to play a
P.art in sentencing outcomes are not important in explaining military
incarceration length outcomes.
;'

.

Of special prominence by their absence were

offender attributes such ~sage and race (See Hagan, 1974).
is of primary concern in civilian and military justice.

For example, race

Some have suggested

that American criminal justice is racist and, as a result, nonwhites receive
unfavorable sentencing outcomes (Reiman, 1979).

Race has been one issue that

has concerned military authorities in recent years (DOD, 1972).

Nevertheless,

like other empirical studies in civilian (Feeley, 1979; Smith & Stevens, 1984)
or military (Perry, 1977) settings, it appears that race is not a contributing
factor in sentence severity decisions.
however, must be qualified.

This finding of treatment similarity,

Welch et al. (1985) found that while whites and

nonwhites did not significantly differ in length of sentence decisions, blacks

35

were sentenced to prison more often than whites.

1

The finding also doesn t

rule out selection bias based on race operating at earlier stages of the
process, or in another legal context (Dannefer & Schutt, 1982).
VI. Conclusion
Three sentencing decisions have been examined:

discharge, confinement

(in/out) and confinement length. The discharge decision is unlike those
sentencing alternatives available to civilian decision makers.

On the other

hand, the determination made about whether to confine followed by a
determination about the length of incarceration are sentencing alternatives
that are typical decisional concerns for civilian practitioners, and have even
b~en addressed in recent civilian sentencing studies (See Sutton, 1978).
Nonetheless, given the fact that sentencing authority is ve_sted in two
sources, the court-martial and the CA, complexity is added to the military
context which is missing from the civilian one.
These multiple measures of sentence severity indicated that the
-~

government was more successful in discharge and deprivation of 1iberty
negotiating than the bargainers were; and the discharge and deprivation of
liberty agreement had little impact on the final CA action.

Furthermore, in

comparing negotiators to other pleaders (differential sentencing hypothesis)
with respect to discharge outcome, the analysis showed that the bargainers
fared relatively badly.

Yet there were no serious differences among the

pleaders in terms of being sentenced to confinement.

The overwhelming

majority of all pleaders received confinement.
_The generally negative results of the first two decisions for bargainers
were not carried over into the third decision, confinement length.

The

negotiated agreements worked better for the accused than for the government,
and had an ameliorating effect on final ~A action.

The comparison of the

36

negotiators to other pleaders also showed that only at the BCD Special level
were the bargainers sentenced by the court to the shortest term.

Still, when

the CA took action at both procedural levels, the bargainers received the
greatest sentencing leniency.

The findings of the second and third measures

are similar to the results obtained by Wheeler, Weisburd & Bode (1982) in the
civilian context.

They too found that pleading method was insignificant in

the prison decision, but 11 approached 11 significance in the length of prison
sentence.
The results of this study, however, must be viewed cautiously.

More

questions may have been raised than answered, particularly in light of the
study's statistical approach to the problem.65 One question is, of course,
validity.

Cases from five USAREUR jurisdictions were grouped together.

While

this approach risks masking differences that may exist in some jurisdictions
but not in others, it does have the advantage of dealing with·the otherwise
small number of cases in each jurisdiction.
A secon~q~estion is the generalizability of this study.

How

.representative_ of military justice are these cases and findings? They
probably apply to the other USAREUR jurisdictions because the ones selected
handled about 76 percent of all USAREUR court-martials during the study time
frame.

But what about non-USAREUR jurisdictions? There would seem to be

little reason for these cases to be treated differently in other military
jurisdictions overseas.66 This leaves the issue of military justice inside of
the U.S.

On the one hand, servicemembers assigned overseas are subject to

scrutiny prior to transfer.

After all, we don't want to offend a host country

by sending over servicemembers who might be troublesome.
process in practice tends to be quite porous.

But the screening

On the other hand, unless a

case is "service-connected," American civilian authorities have jurisdiction
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over servicemembers committing crimes in the various states.

But civil

authorities have a history of welcoming the opportunity for the military to
take jurisdiction in a case.67 Therefor~, on balance, there is little reason
to expect that had the research been conducted in the U.S., cases and findings
would deviate dramatically from what is reported here.
The findings of this study suggest that plea bargaining in the military,
while unique in important respects, has many parallels to civilian justice.
Nonetheless, this area requires further research.

Future studies would

benefit from concentration on specific offenses categories.68 Another
recommendation would be to measure differences in outcome according to rank.
American justice has been characterized by conflict theorists as a biased
process.

Those from lower class positions in society are dealt with more

severely {Carter & Clelland, 1979;Chambliss, 1969; Quinney, 1970; Turk, 1966).
More than civilian justice, military justice may be be viewed as a system of
class justice.

Both ideas, however, assume that a large enough sample can be

drawn, a problem more of receptivity of military justice authorities than
availablity of data.

Notes
1 While Hagan and Nagel {1982), for example, found that guilty pleaders
received sentences average twenty-five months less than not guilty pleaders,
Willison {1984) reported that guilty pleaders received sentences some
thirty-three values above those pleading not guilty.
2 Guilty pleaders received marginally more lenient sentences than those
electing bench trial however, with the largest difference appearing in the
decision to incarcerate.
'3

The accused, commonly viewed from a rational consumer framework, seeks to
lessen severity of the criminal sanction by agreeing to plead guilty in return
for a predictable sentence {Landes, 1971; Nagel & Neef, 1976a, 1976b, 1977).
Nevertheless, conventional rationality in decision making may be exaggerated.
Some accused have a low tolerance for ambiguity or a sense of helplessness,
and may plead guilty to promptly reduce the uncertainty of the situation
{Alschuler, 1976, Littrell, 1979; NardulJi, 1978). Uhlman &Walker {1979:

38

231) found that a plea is no bargain for many defendants.

In trying to
understand why defendants continue to plead, they suggested that "the
anxieties, personal stress, humiliation and publicity surrounding the trial
process are so great that even minimal sentencing rewards may be sufficient to
make the defendant opt for a plea in exchange for a quick and certain
settlement. 11
4 For example, variations in geographic region (rural vs. urban) and in
organization (prosecutorial policy [Jacoby, 1976]; workgroup style [Eisenstein
&Jacob, 1977]) will affect the role of plea on sentencing.
5

Some studies focus on an array of crimes, while a few analyze selected
crime categories. Two studies (Rhodes, 1979; Brereton & Caspar, 1981) fourid
that pleading guilty was associated with leniency for robbers but not for some
burglars. One of these studies (Rhodes, 1979) also found that sentence
leniency was withheld from guilty pleaders charged with assault and burglary.
Other studies included robbery and burglary among a group of offenses and
found leniency for pleaders, masking the impact of plea for specific offenses
(Nardull·i, 1978; Uhlman & Walker, 1979).
6 These uniformed Americans are directly controlled by military justice, a
social control system which has features of both criminal and juvenile justice
as well as its own unique attributes (See Keveles, 1985). Anoth~r 1.5 million
Reserve and National Guard personnel, and even retired servicemembers anct some
civilians are subject to court-martial jurisdiction under certain
circumstances (Schlueter, 1982; Uniform Code of Military Justice [UC~~]:
Articles 2, 3, 1983].
7

Before the Military Justice Act of 1968 (Public Law 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335)
and except in the j urorl ess summary court-martial, sentencing power was
conferred exclusively on a military jury (trial by court members) consisting
of commissioned ·officers, or if the defendants· are from the enlisted ranks and
they so :request,>- courts composed of at 1east one-third enlisted personnel
(UCMJ, Ar.tic1e 25 [c] [1]). With the 1968 Act, defendants were given the
right to request trial by j_udge alone at general or special court-martials.
If defendants do not formally make such a request, then they will be tried by
court members as in the past.
8 Suspensions are issued for a stated period of time, and unless a suspended
sentence is vacated because of violation of military law during the period of
suspension, the suspended sentence is remitted upon its completion
mechanically or, if before it is concluded, by a CA s action.
9 In those cases in which an accused pleads not guilty, the trial counsel,
that is, the officer presenting the government's case, presents documentary
evidence from the defendant's personnel file (age, rank, prior service and
nature of pretrial custody, if any), as well as evidence of prior
court-martial convictions and nonjudicial punishment (UCMJ, Article 15).
Nevertheless, if the accused pleads guilty, the trial counsel can present, in
addition, any admissible evidence of aggravation. The rules of evidence for
the defense are often relaxed. The defense attorney may offer reasons for the
accused's misconduct (extenuation), or he may show how good a soldier the
accused is or bad a family background the accused has had (mitigation). A
guilty plea accused who offers testimony during sentencing inconsistent with
1
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the plea forces the judge to once again inquire into the providency of the
plea.
lO Deprivation of freedom for any period can include hard labor without
co,lf'inement, restriction, and what has been-styled "confinement at hard labor"
. (CHL). As explained by military justice personnel, hard labor without
confinement means the imposition of additional, more onerous duty assignments.
Restriction usually refers to placing physical limitations on the movement of
a servicemember. For example, offenders may not only be limited to the
confines of a military reservation, but also to the installatio~'s mess hall,
chapel, barracks and duty station. Today, confinement at hard labor simply
means incarceration at a military prison. Since sentencing in the armed
forces is i ndetenni nate, specifying only the maximum penalty that can be
imposed, offenders may be released at any time.

11 Forfeitures of pay and allowances and reduction in rank depend on service
regulations about a sentence to a punitive discharge and/or confinement at
hard labor. Forfeitures may be total, two-thirds, or partial. The loss is
expressed in a specific dollar amount and for a particular period of time. An
enlisted person in the Army is reduced automatically to the lowest pay grade
when there is an approved sentence to punitive discharge, confinement, or hard
labor without confinement.
12 Certainly the civilian authorities today are hard pressed to exile or throw
an offender out of society, though some would argue that prisons are forms of
internal exile. For a nation state, stripping a person of his citizenship and
then deporting him perhaps approaches the function of a punitive discharge.
But denaturalization presently is a complicated, relatively rare phenomenon.
Alternatively, a punitive discharge may be viewed as a performance similar to
that of firing an employee from his job, which assumes that soldiering can be
equated to civilian work, an idea that is highly questionable (Effron, 1974).
lh any case, the military believes that there is a distinctive need for both
definitely el imi nati ng an offender from the ranks and ·showing its disapproval
of the offender's behavior. The punitive discharge, which can be either a
dishonorable (DD) or bad conduct discharge (BCD), is one method of "kicking
out~• a soldier in what the military_ perceives is an effectively harsh,
stigmatizing way. The DD is considered a more damaging label (MCM, paragraph
76a) supposedly involving the loss of more veteran benefits than is the BCD.
The military views either of these as an infliction of punishment itself and
hopes11 the civilian
society will impose severe social and economic sanctions on
the worthless 11 former servicemember (Fox,. 1977; Lance, 1978).
13 Judges are commonly assi-gned to hear cases in a jurisdiction for a specific
tour of duty that may last two years or more. Court members serve for much
shorter periods of times, but when empaneled, they too hear a series of cases.
14 For example, the prosecution predicts that the court will given an accused
12 months confinement. The defense predicts a 36 month sentence. They deal
for 24 months. The court actually gives 18 months. The.government wins. The
term 11 accused beating the deal" is a misnomer.

15 In the above example, this would happen when the court actually gives the
accused a 30 month sentence.
sentence. The accused wins.

The 24 month agreement underiated the court
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16 Sentencing practices of member panels are more influenced by the state of
·its members' emotions. Feelings are affected by the kind of cases being
heard, how many cases have been heard, and .how 1ong the panel has been
sitting. One justice official suggested that the longer a lay court sat
hearing cases, the more conviction prone jurors become, and the more severe
the penalities they hand out. Other justice agents, however, could not
identify a predictable member sentencing pattern and that was the problem!
17 Most serious charged crime refers ·to an offense seriousness scale developed
to organize and reduce the variety of offenses charged against accused. These
primary offenses were collapsed and ranked into 46 offense categories
according to the maximum authorized punishments that an accused could receive
as defined by the Table of Maximum Punishments in the MCM (para. 127c). In
those cases in which two or more categories would have the same maximum
punishment, the prior interviews with justice personnel provided guidance in
rank ordering decision making. To characterize the offense, each of these 46
categories were further divided into six categories of types of crime
according to the most serious offense per case across the categories.
18 Prior record was not used for four reasons: 1) most servicemembers (95
percent) did not have a prior court-martial or civilian criminal record; 2}
although the disciplinary infraction (Article 15s) history of accused were
included in nearly 50 percent of the cases, these offenses were generally
minor military (mi-nor AWOL or disrespectful conduct) or civilian (marihuana,
possession or destruction of property offenses}; 3) during the study time
frame a change in case law affected the introduction of Article 15s in court;
4) even though ten percent of the cases had missing values for Article 15s,
they were originally included in analyses; however, the variable did not
explained more than a traced of thi variance of the dependent variables and
was removed.
19 The last category referred to agreements in which the parties did not
contract for a specific agreement, but rather they agreed to whatever
discharge sentence the cour.t would adjudge.
20 Some SJAs recognized that civilian society did not differentiate between
the two types of discharges, and that civilians failed to penalize those who
received any punitive discharge. As one SJA said, "Even Walt Disney received
a dishonorable discharge."
21 Under the terms of the typical suspension agreement, the accused would
"beat a court sentence" of a punitive discharge and be given a probationary
period during which time a violation of military law would result in the
lifting of the suspension and the execution of the court sentence to a
discharge. On the other hand, an accused who kept out of trouble would get a
seocond chance at the end of the suspension period to successfully complete
his military career.
22 Of the DD bargainers, 48 percent receive~ a DD, 41 percent received BCDs
and 11 percent received no.discharge. Of course, by definition, these DD
bargainers could not beat the court sentence •.
23 Of those nine who agreed to a suspension, six beat the deal by receiving no
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discharge. Finally, one of the three who negotiated for no discharge was
given a BCD, thereby beating the court sentence.
24 Only one accused beat a contracted BCD by receiving no discharge from the
court, and four of the 17 who agreed to accept a suspension beat the
suspension by receiving no discharge. On the other hand, one of the six who
bargained for no discharge received a BCD with a recommendation for
suspension.
25 46 percent of OD negotiated agreements were reduced to BCDs, and 18 percent
of punitive discharge agreements were reduced to no discharge.
26 At the GCM level (n=27), 35 percent received ODs, 50 percent were given
BCDs, while the remaining 15 percent received no discharge. At the BCD
Special level (n=lO), three received a BCD, one of which was a recommendation
for suspension, and seven received no discharge. It appears then that by
vesting decision making power ~xclusively in the hands of the court, the
government was taking a small chance in a surprising outcome.
27 In absolute numbers and collapsing the suspensions wfth its appropriate
discharge type, the CA discharge action represented eight less ODs, seven more
BCDs, and one more no discharge than that which the court gave.
28 Again in absolute number and collap~ing the suspensions into its
appropriate discharge type, the change in absolute number between the CA and
court discharge represented a difference of only one.
29 The strength of association was stronger for the relationship between CA
action and court sentence (Kendall's tau c = .76) than between CA action and
discharge a~reement (Kendall's tau c = .43).
30 The strength of association between CA action and both court sentence
(Kendall's tau c = .69) and discharge agreement (Kendall's tau c = .65) was
approximately the same.
31 The GCM discharge outco~es were also treated as a-dichotomous choice of two
outcomes (no discharge/discharge). The analysis yielded results similar to
those found in the dichotomous outcomes. The same six variables entered in
the dichotomous analysis were also entered in the trichotomous outcome.
Sexual offense, number of charges, and straight guilty pleas, however, were
excluded from significantly separating the groups •. Violent offense appeared
to contribute the most to the significant discrimination; age the least to the
separation. Based on the group centroids, a discharge outcome evidently tends
to be associated with nonviolent offenses, more serious offenses, weapon
involvement, judge alone sentencing, drug offenses, and younger offenders.
The Re, however, is only marginally less than the first function in the
trichotomous outcome.
32 The unstandardardized coefficients for straight guilty plea reveal that,
although this variable moves cases away from the no discharge group in the
first function, it does show a rather stronger ability to move cases away from
the dishonorable discharge group in the second function.
33 The relationship between GCM pleaders and CA discharge 'action was
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statistically significant (x2 = 10.04, 4df, p. < .05). The strength of
association was only slightly weaker than the court outcomes (Contingency
Coefficient= .18 vs •• 22).
34 At the CA action stage, the DD percentage difference between the bargainers
and not guilty pleaders was reduced to 11.2 percent, and the straight guilty
pleaders to 17.2 percent. In other words, the differences between the court
sentence and the CA action with respect to the differences among the pleaders
were very small: four percent between the bargainers and not guilty pleaders,
and five percent between the bargainers and straight guilty pleaders.
35 The relationship between pleading and CA discharge action was not
statistically significant (x2 = 3.86, 2df, p. ~ .14). Again, however, the
strength of association was only slightly weaker than the court outcomes
(Contingency Coefficient= .16 vs •• 22).
36 The CA BCD Special percentage difference between the bargainers and not
guilty pleaders was reduced to 16 percent, only a four percent flattening from
the court sentence, and between bargainers and straight guilty pleaders was
reduced to 21 percent, only a five percent flattening from the court sentence.
37 One may argue that getting out of the service is preferable to staying in.
Negotiators then received sentencing leniency. But such a view misses the
point of the values of military culture and the meaning of its decisions. See
note 12.
38 After all, the judge at the guilty plea providency inquiry not only had to
examine the accused 1 s understanding of the meaning and effect of pleading
guilty before the judge could accept the guilty plea, but any PTA had to-have
its various provisions, exclusive of the sentencing portion of the agreement,
dissected by the judge as well.
39 The judge's efforts were a result of military appellate court decisions,
especially those by the U.S. Court of Military Appeals (COMA), which aimed to
regulate and closely monitor the providency inquiry into the plea of guilty,
particularly one with a PTA attached.
40 One percent, however, were able to obtain an agreement to suspend
confinement, and seven percent were able to negotiate an agreement whereby the
court would decide the confinement question (approvals as adjudged). The
remaining 92 percent were agreement to confinement.
41 See -note 10 for explanation of these liberty deprivation terms.
42 Also, fewer GCM bargainers were given restriction or hard labor without
confinement in comparison to BCD Special negotiators (3 percent to 78
percent). The relationship between procedural level and court deprivation of
liberty sentence was statistically significant (Kendall's tau c = .10, n =
191, p. < .05}.
43 Seventeen cases affected the court decisions.- Fourteen negotiated for
confinement. They received either no confinement (six GCMs and two BCD
Specials} or hard labor without confinement or restriction (one GCM and five
BCD Specials}. Additionally, one BCD Special plea bargainer who agreed to a
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suspension of confinement received no confinement. Of the two·accused who
beat the court sentence, one had negotiated for a limited amount of
confinement time and received a life term, while the other had negotiated for
suspended confinement and received confinement from a GCM court.
44 The approved as adjudged group tended to receive confinement at hard labor:
70 percent.
45 Twelve accused could have received life imprisonment. Three were given
life tenns.
46 Judges were found to be significantly more likely to sentence an accused to
confinement than court members were (tau c = .14, p. < .001) (91 percent to 75
percent).
47 The only difference was that 81 percent of the not guilty pleaders received
confinement.
48 Nevertheless, one SJA did offer a third incarceration goal second to
deterrence in importance: retribution.
49 At one continuing education conference for prosecutorial and defense
officers in West Gennany which we attended, personnel from this facility (the
retraining brigade at Fort Riley, Kansas) flew in, presented a slide show, and
answered questions about their activities. The presentation revealed that the
programs at the RB are centered on discipline and physical training.
50 Asking one SJA what happens to a defendant sent to Fort Leavenworth, he
responded by saying that the accused gets a 11 full paid vacation. 11
51 Deprivation of liberty sentences have no minimum length in the military,
only a maximum. The maximum sentence for each offense is set out in the
Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM), paragraphs 125 through 127. Except for the
jusisdictional limitations of a court, the maximum confinement length in a
case is arrived at by summi.ng the confinement length identified for each
nonmultiplious guilty finding. One sentence is adjudged which satisfies all
the findings.
52 Twelve out of the 186 cases in which information was available, however,
were approved as adjudged cases.
·
53 Negotiated suspensions referred to a period of time after an accused served
a predetermined portion of the confinement sentence. An accused who did not
violate military law during the time served would then have the suspended
period vacated. The interviewed subjects explained that the purpose of
suspending part of a confinement term was to encourage the accused to engage
in good behavior during his incarceration. That is, suspensions promoted rule
conformity which served the ends of institutional control. Typically, the
suspended period would be the difference between the negotiated hard time and
the court sentence. For example, an accused might negotiate for six months of
hard time and to suspend any court sentence in excess of this six month
period. If the court sentenced the accused to nine months, that court
punishment would be approved by the CA; however, the sentence in excess of the
six months would be suspended for six months at which time (unless the
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suspension is sooner vacated} the suspended portion (three months} would be
remitted without further action.
54 Stepwise regression was us~Jwith.listwise deletion of missing data. In
those cases where the offender received a life term, the sentence length has
been coded 600 (50 years}. - 55 Convictions based on multiple charges may increase the maximum possible
penalties at the GCM level.
56 The maximum penalty for rape, for example, is death or a life term. No
servicemernber, however, has been executed for any offense for over 20 years.
57 An accused before a general or special courts-martial has a right to the
appointment of legally qualified military counsel at government expense. The
government, however, will not pay for a civilian attorney (UCMJ, Articles
27,38}.

58 Although the SJAs generally had high praise for civilians practicing in
their jurisdictions, two SJAs did relate "horror stories 11 of how civilians
"screwed up, 11 and that the SJAs would see to it that these few11 civilians would
never practice in their jurisdiction again. By "screwing up, the SJAs were
relating cases in which these civilians had requested too many continuances or
filed too many motions.
59 The 134 GCM bargainers sentenced to confinement were facing a mean maximum
confinement length sentence of 122.0 months. Those GCM court sentenced
confinees who had negotiated for a specific length of confinement had
bargained for 21.6 months. The BCD Special bargainers sentenced to
confinement had negotiated for a mean confinement length sentence of 3.1
months.
60 One may infer that the GCM bargainers were more serious offenders than the
other two sets of pleaders. On the other hand, the prosecutorial practice of
overcharging affects sentencing, inducing accused to plead guilty. A revie'II
of overcharging in the sample, however, found that this practice is not
widespread.
61 Additional analyses performed, however, indicated that such a finding may
be an artifact of court member sentencing. Given the earlier discussion of
judicial leniency toward straight guilty pleaders, a closer examination of
sentencing court and confinement length sentencing for the pleaders was
performed, especially for those processed at the GCM level. Sentencing
analysis of GCM judges revealed that rather than straight guilty pleaders (18
months) resembling negotiated ones (-31 months), they are much more closely
aligned to not guilty pleaders (17 months). The sentencing distortion is
attributable to court member sentencing, specifically the three straight
guilty pleaders sentenced by court members (170 months). In fact, the data
reveal that it is one straight guilty pleader charged with rape who received
40 years that affected the mean. Perhaps this one soldier was intent on
punishing himself. What is interesting is that the CA reduced the sentence
lengths of both not guilty pleaders and guilty pleaders but not straight
guilty pleaders sentenced by court members. Also, irrespective of plea, court
member sentencing was consistently longer than any judicial ones. These
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results, however, do not control for seriousness of offense.
62 Perhaps civilian counsel was unaware of the kinds of arguments to which
military courts favorably respond. Alternatively or additionally, the court
may not have appreciated those accused who went outside the military system to
hire counsel.
63 A difference of means test, however, indicated that only the BCD Special
bargainers received a substantial sentencing break for their plea. To examine
more closely the differences-between the bargainers and nonbargainers at each
procedural level, a difference of means test was performed. While at the GCM
level, the difference between bargainers (18.5) and nonbargainers (25.3) was
not significant (t = -1.35, n = 258, p. = .18), at the BCD Special level the
difference between bargainers (2.9) and nonbargainers (3.7) was significant (t
= -2.68, n = 114, p. < .01).
64 It may be assumed that offense seriousness was highly correlated with
sexual offenses or weapon involvement, variables exhibiting strong
relationships to GCM confinement length outcomes. Nevertheless, perusal of
the correlation matrix of independent variables failed to show this as a
definitive explanation. The importance of sexual offenses in military
sentencing, however, is in line with Walsh (1985) who found that sexual
offenders received harsher penalities than nonsexual offenders within the
lower classes.
65 For example, Brereton &Casper (1981: 50) argue that "when differentials
are most effective, they are least observable." A successful policy of
sentencing differentials would increase the percentage of cases that would go
to trial for meritorious reasons only. The sentencing authority would
recognize the inappropriateness of giving accused a trial tax of increased
sentence severity for raising salient legal questions.
66 Military justice agents are periodically transferred from one area of the
world to another, and jurisdictional agreements between the U.S. and a host
country do not vary substantially. While host countries have original
jurisdiction over U.S. servicemembers in situations affecting their citizens,
they waive the right to exercise authority in over 90 percent of their cases.
One interesting reason for the willingness to _waive jurisdiction is their view
of the American military sentencing structure. They believe it is much more
severe than their own. This belief sometimes backfires on them. In the
Federal Republic of Germany, for example, plea bargaining is prohibited.
German prosecutors are initially satisfied with the military sentence given to
servi cemembers. But \-they then become confused when they occasionally
discover that the acutal punishment is much different from the court sentence.
German prosecutors even become hostile toward their American guests in those
rare instances in which servicemembers sentenced to confinement in the U.S.
are returned to duty in Germany and then commit another offense.
67 Local prosecutorial and judicial resources would not have to be expended in
cases marginally of interest to the community. Further, while USAREUR justice
appears to be a more totally integrated social control system than that which
currently exists in the U.S., recent case law has enlarged the meaning of
service-connection, allowing greater military control over crimes committed
off-base in the U.S. (See United States v. Lockwood, 15 M.J. 1 [CMA 1983]).
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68 See note 5. A problem is generated, however, where there are few too cases
for any specific offense, an issue in the present study. A proposed remedy
for controlling seriousness of the charge is to collapse an array of offenses
into categories based upon the maximum sentences set out in the Manual for
Courts-Martial (for example, three and six months, one, five, ten, and twenty
years, over twenty years). The solution would be far from perfect (different
offenses with similar maximums still have different meanings for decision
makers), but it would be practical under the circumstances.
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Table la
Relative Contribution of Significant Variables
to GCM Discharg~ Agreements

Change in
Rao' s V
~

Variables

Rao' sV

Civilian Defense Counsel

7.67

.05

7.67

.05

Pretrial Confinement

14.13

.01

6.36

.05

Offense Seriousness

20.01

.01

5.87

.05

Drug Offense

33.50

.001

13.50

.01

£.:._:
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Table lb
Canonical Discriminant Functions of
GCM Discharge Agreements

Eigenvalue-relative percentage

First
Function

Second
Function

69.93

30.07

Canonical correlation (Re)

·------

.419

.289
9.508

X2

30.45

df

8

3

p.

<.001

<.05
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Table le
,.

Discriminant Functional Coefficients and
Group Centroids of GCM Discharge Agreements

First Fune ti on
Functional Coefficients
Variables

Standard- Unstanized
darized

Second Function
Standard- Unstanized darized

1.04

.03

.01

Drug Offense

.96

1.17

.16

Pretrial Confinement

.52

Offense Seriousness

Civilian Defense
Counsel

-

-.51

1.37

1.71

.82

-1.12

-

-.07

.26

BCD Discharge

.25

-.27

No.Discharge

-.90

-.18

·--

Sample size=ll3

.09

-.52

Group Centroids
Dishonorable Discharge

-

.09

-3.37

Constant

.04

.33
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Table 2a
Relative Contribution of Significant Variables
to GCM Court GCM Discharge Outcomes

Rao 1 sV

Change in
Rao' s V
~

Sexual Offense

34.87

.001

34.87

.001

Sentencing Court

72.44

.001

37.57

.001

Offense Seriousness

94.40

.001

21.96

.001

Drug Offense

118 .43

.001

24.03

.001

Weapon Involvement

136.17

.001

17.74

.001

Violent Offense

158.35

.001

22.18

.001

Number of Charges

168.07

.001

9.72

.01

Age

178 .28

.001

10.21

.01

Straight Guilty Plea

185.01

.001

6.74

.05

Negotiated Guilty Plea

187.66

.001

2.64

.27 N.S.

Variables

~
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Table 2b
Canonical Discriminant Functions of
GCM Court Discharge Outcomes

Eigenvalue-relative percentage

First
Function

Second
Function

81.9

18.1

Canonical correlation (Re)

.327

.593

x2

152.37

31.564

df

20

9

p.

<.001

<.001
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Table 2c
Discriminant Functional Coefficients and
Group Centroids of GCM Court Discharge Outcome

First Function
Functional Coefficients
Variables

Unstandarized

Standard- Unstanized darized

Offense Seriousness

.67

.01

- .11

.07

Weapon Involvement

.60

.40

-.27

.32

Violent Offense

._ .53

-.65

.58

.13

Sentencing Court

.51

1.17

-.17

-.30

Drug Offense

.40

.80

-.32

-.95

Sexual Offense

.25

.12

.71

2.18

-.21

-.07

.33

.04

Number of Charges

.21

.13

.26

.16

Negotiated Guilty Plea

.13

.27

.14

.57

-.08

.36

-.30

-1.12

Age

··---

Standardized

Second Function

Straight Guilty Plea
Constant

-3.82

-.27

Gro.up Centroids
Dishonorable Discharge

.41

1.10

BCD Discharge

.17

-.38

-.77

-.19

No Discharge
Sample size=286
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Table 3a
Relative Contribution of Significant Variables
to BCD Special Court Discharge Outcome

Variables

----

~

Change in
Rao 1 s V ~
8.52
.01

8.52

.01

Negotiated Guilty Plea

17 .31

.001

8.79

.01

Pretrial Confinement

22.60

.001

5.29

.05

Straight Guilty Plea

23.23

.001

.63

Violent Offense

.

Rao 1 s V

.42 NS
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Table 3b
Canonical Discriminant Functional Analysis
of BCD Special Court Discharge Outcome

Variables

Discriminant Function Coefficients
Standardized Onstandara1zed
-.78

-1.65

Negotiated Guilty Plea

.59

1.30

Pretrial Confinement

.48

1.53

Straight Guilty Plea

-.17

- .45

Violent Offense

.14

Constant
Group Centroids
BCD Discharge= .45
No Discharge = -.38
Rc=.388 (Rc2=.15)
X2=21.O6, 4df~p.>.O01
Sample size=133

58

Table 4a
Relative Contribution of Significant Variables
to GCM Convening Authority Discharge Outcomes

Sexual Offense

34.72

Change in
Rao s V
~
34.72
.001

Sentencing Court

67.53

.001

32.81

.001

Offense Seriousness

88.97

.001

21.44

.001

Variables

Rao sV
1

1

~

.001

Drug Offense

105.2

.001

16.20

.001

Weapon Involvement

127.6

.001

22.48

.001

Violent Offense

150.2

.001

22.60

.001

Pretrial Confinement

163.4

.001

13.11

.01

Straight Guilty Plea

168.3

.001

4.92

.08 NS

N.egoti ated Gui 1ty P1ea

169.7

.001

1.39

.49 NS
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Table 4b
Canonical Discriminant Functions of
GCM Convening Authority Discharge Outcomes

Eigenvalue-relative percentage

First
Function

Second
Function

84.72

15.28

Canonical correlation (Re)

.298

.592

X2

137.57

24.366

df

18

8

p.

<.001

<.01
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Table 4c
Discriminant Functional Coefficients and
Group Centroids of GCM Convening Authority Discharge Outcome

First Function
Functional Coefficients
Variables

Unstandarized

Standard- Unstanized darized

Weapon Involvement

.65

.55

.36

.25

Seriousness of Offense

.61

.02

-.06

.08

-.58

- .63

-.35

.26

Sentencing Court

.54

1.15

.20

- .65

Drug Offense

.35

. 71

.46

-1.39

Sexual Offense

.29

.43 ,

-.56

2.31

Pretrial Confinement

.29

.54

-.05

.43

Negotiated Guilty Plea

.11

.39

.03

.24

-.08

.22

.34

-1.08

Violent Offense

Straight Guilty Plea

---

Standard-:ized

Second Function

Constant

-2.52

-1.85

Group Centroids
Dishonorable Discharge

.51

1.24

BCD Discharge

.11

-.42

-.71

-.05

No Discharge
Sample size=269
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Table 5a
Relative Contribution of Significant Variables
to BCD Special Convening Authority Discharge Outcome

Variables

Rae's V

~

Change in
Rae's V E:....2.
11.92 .001

Violent Offense

11.92

.001

Negotiated Guilty Plea

16.91

.001

4.99

Straight Guilty Plea

17.58

.001

.66

.05

.42 NS

Table 5b
Canonical Discriminant Functional Analysis
of BCD Special Convening Authority Discharge Outcome

Variables

Violent Offense
Negotiated Guilty Plea
Straight Guilty Plea

Discriminant Function Coefficients
Standardized Unstandardized
.89

1.90

-.47

-1.04

.20

.55

Constant

-.48

Group Centroids
BCD Discharge= -.40
No Discharge·= .31
Rc=.331 (Rc2=.11)
X2=16.397, 3df,p.>.001
Sample size=l44
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Table 6
Regression Results for GCM Confinement
Length Pretrial Agreements

Variables

Std.
Error B

B

Beta

Sexual Offense

40.66

.43

6.35

29.90**

Weapon Involved

18.37

.26

5.19

12.34**

Civilian Defense
Counsel

15.06

.21

5.31

8.47**

2.62

.14

Number of
Charges
Constant

-15.53

R2 = .32
*p. < .05
**p. < .01

Number of cases= 136

1.31

F

3.94*
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Table 7
Regression Results for GCM Court
Confinement Length Sentence

B

Beta

Std.
Error B

Sexual Offense

58.59

.45

8.37

64.82**

Weapon Involved

20.46

.22

6.39

17.16**

Number of
Charges

6.42

.22

1.61

17.18**

Offense
· Seriousness

.87

.15

.35

5.97*

Civilian Defense
Counsel

16 .37

.13

6.51

5.81*

Straight Guilty
Plea

9.86

.04

9.13

.59

Plea Bargained

5.78

.06

5.85

.33

Variables

·-~

Constant

-55.86

R2 = .334

*p. < .05
**p. < .01

Number of cases= 259

F
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Table 8
Regression Results for BCD Special Court
Confinement Length Sentence

Variables
Offense
Seriousness

B

Beta

Std.
Error B

F

.05

.32

.01

11.51**

Sentencing
Agent

-.90

-.24

.33

7.03**

Pretrial
Confinement

.89

.19

.42

4.33*

Straight Guilty

.25

.08

.35

•75

Plea Bargained

-.10

-.03

.31

.10

Constant

2.91

R2

=

.199

*p. < .OS
**p. < .01

Number of cases= 105

..":-~~!'.' ·,:-·
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Table 9
Regression Results for
GCM Convening Authority
Confinement Length Sentence

B

Beta

Std.
Error B

Sexual Offense

47.33

.41

6.03

49.91**

Weapon Involved

22.99

.27

4.74

23.51**

5.78

.21

1.29

16.13**

15.05

.15

5.24

7.78**

-12.01

-.12

5.09

4.97*

Straight Guilty
Plea

14.06

.12

7.47

5.19*

Plea Bargained

- 2.26

-.03

4.83

.22

Constant

-17.24

Variables

Number of
Charges
Civilian Defense
Counsel
Sentencing
Agent

R2 = .331

*p. < .05
**p. < .01

Number of cases= 256

F
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Table 10
Regression Results for
BCD Special Convening Authority
Confinement Length Sentence

Std.
Error B

B

Beta

.06

.36

.01

15.26**

Sentencing
Agent

-1.07

-.29

.31

10.58**

Plea Bargained

- .75

-.24

.30

7.62**

Pretrial
Confinement

.94

.20

.39

5.64*

Straight Guilty
Plea

.24

.06

.33

.54

Variables
Offense
Seriousness

Constant

R2

=

.307

*p. < .05
**p. < .01

Number of cases= 106

2.77

F

